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Abstract
Historically, unexpected improvements in mortality rates have led to large, unanticipated increases in life
expectancy, with accompanying increases in the value of defined benefit pension liabilities. As a result,
longevity risk needs to be measured and managed alongside the financial risks facing these plans. The
emergence of new instruments for hedging longevity risk means that a complete toolkit is now available
for managing these plans in a way that is sustainable over the long term. Decisions to hedge or eliminate
longevity risk need to be made in a holistic framework. For corporate pension plans this means taking
account of the corporate finance perspective, as well as the interdependencies between the sponsor and
the plan. This paper addresses the importance of measuring and managing longevity risk and presents a
holistic framework for sustainable pension plan management that facilitates longevity risk management
decision-making.
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Chapter 6
Longevity Risk Management, Corporate
Finance, and Sustainable Pensions
Guy Coughlan
Longevity risk poses a significant threat to the provision of retirement income. With
life expectancy having steadily risen in most of the world’s countries, so too has the
cost of providing adequate income in retirement. Moreover, the fact that actuaries
and demographers have consistently underestimated these increases in life expectancy is a cause for concern and calls into question the sustainability of defined
benefit (DB) pension plans and the adequacy of individual retirement savings.1
Until recently, longevity risk was an unacknowledged risk in DB pension plans,
despite being an obvious risk for individuals who financed their retirement directly
from savings. Just how big longevity risk actually is depends on the details of each
pension plan: in particular, the precise nature of its benefits and the demographic
profile of its members (or beneficiaries). For most DB pension plans, longevity risk
has generally been smaller than both the investment risk associated with the pension assets and the interest rate risk associated with the pension liability. Yet for
pension plans that have substantially de-risked and/or have a low funded status,
longevity risk can emerge as much more significant.
The development of new tools to measure and manage longevity risk means
that DB pension plans now have at their disposal a complete toolkit for ensuring
the plan is managed in a sustainable fashion. But simply having the tools available is
not enough. To make sustainability a real possibility requires not only appropriate
implementation, but also, for many plan sponsors, a change in mindset. In particular, it means taking a perspective which has a greater focus on the financial economics of the plan and a reduced focus on the accounting. For corporate pension plans,
this means also taking account of the principles of corporate finance and the interrelationships between the pension plan and the sponsor.
This chapter emphasizes the importance of addressing longevity risk in DB pension plans and presents a framework for the sustainable management of these plans
based on these observations. Our framework provides a basis for long-term management of the plan, in a way that minimizes the likelihood that the sponsor will be
required to make an excessively large unplanned contribution at some future date,
and also maximizes the likelihood that plan members will receive their full pension
benefits.
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In what follows, we address the notion of sustainability for DB pension plans
and what it means for pension management. We then discuss the size of longevity
risk and its significance for DB plans. Subsequently we review the development
of the longevity market and the new instruments for managing longevity risk that
make sustainability a realistic goal. The corporate finance context of pensions is
then presented as the appropriate stage for addressing longevity risk management
decisions. Our discussion emphasizes the importance of understanding the differing, but interrelated, perspectives of the sponsor and the plan. Finally, we present a
framework for sustainable management of DB pension plans, which incorporates
decisions related to management of longevity risk.

Long-term Alternatives for DB Plans
Over the long term, there are only two possible strategic alternatives for the sponsor of a DB pension plan: transfer it or keep it. The decision to transfer it, now or
at some time in the future, means executing a pension buyout, or termination, with
an insurance company. This is the traditional approach to managing longevity risk
and it involves selling the longevity risk along with all other risks and transferring
pension obligations to the insurer, thereby removing the pension from the sponsor’s
balance sheet. In contrast, a decision to keep the pension plan entails a commitment to maintain it for the long term. This involves managing the longevity risk
(along with all other risks) over the life of the plan.
In both cases, the management of the pension assets against the pension liability
requires a focus on the underlying economics of the plan, rather than the accounting. When the objective is a buyout/termination, the insurer will certainly take
this long-term economic perspective. So moving from an accounting focus to an
economic focus soon becomes prudent. When the objective is to keep the plan over
the long term, this necessitates a long-term perspective on performance and risk,
along with a long-term commitment to manage the plan sustainably. Since it is the
economics that matters over the long term, an economic perspective is also vital in
this case.

Managing DB Pension Plans Sustainably
Insurance companies in the business of providing life annuities and pension buyouts are practical examples of the kind of sustainable management relevant to DB
pension plans. These insurers, in fact, make a profitable business out of managing what are effectively (at least in economic terms) DB pension plans. They do so
by fully (or indeed over-) funding the liability, hedging unrewarded and unwanted
risks, and managing a carefully designed, diversified investment strategy. Moreover,
they do so within the tightly controlled regime of insurance regulation, which
effectively places limits on the minimal level of funding, the risk profile, and the
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investment strategy. It is partly because of these restrictions that the annuity business has remained profitable and sustainable.
Clearly DB pension plans are different from annuity portfolios and cannot be
managed in exactly the same way. In particular, unlike annuity portfolios, they may
be underfunded and are associated with a sponsor for whom managing pensions
is not the main business line. Nevertheless, the insurance example provides practical pointers as to what pension plans and their sponsors can do to make them more
sustainable.
Sustainability for DB pension plans means being able to manage the plans for
the long term, without (a) exposing the sponsors to the potential requirement of
making excessively large contributions at some future date and (b) exposing plan
members to increased risk that the sponsors are unable to pay pension benefits in
full. In practice, sustainability can only be achieved by ensuring two things. The
first is that a credible and sustainable strategy is in place for funding the pension
plan through contributions. The second is that the risks facing the plan are appropriately sized and diversified, relative to the plan’s funded status and relative to the
size, risk profile, and financial strength of the sponsor. These require a thorough
understanding of both the perspective of the pension plan and the perspective of
the sponsor, which reflects the interdependencies between them in the context of
corporate finance. This is a point on which we elaborate further on in the chapter.

How Significant is Longevity Risk for
DB Pension Plans?
As mentioned, the significance of longevity risk for a DB pension plan depends on
the details of the plan:: specifically, the nature of its benefits and the demographic
profile of its members. Some key factors determining the size of this risk are listed
Table 6.1 Factors that impact the longevity risk in a DB pension plan
Category

Factor

Demographic

Number of members
Age profile
Gender profile
Socioeconomic profile
Aggregate health profile
Profile of spouses and dependents
Willingness of members to take lump sums (if available)
Utilization of other optional benefits
Fixed benefits vs. inflation- or COLA-linked benefits
Nature of lump sum options
Nature of spouse and dependent benefits
Nature of other optional benefits and payment adjustments

Benefit structure

Source: Author’s tabulation.
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in Table 6.1. The principal demographic factors relate to the age and socioeconomic profiles of the members, whereas the factors relating to benefit structure
include whether the benefit payments are fixed or rise in line with inflation, or some
other cost of living adjustment (COLA). If a plan has an inflation- or COLA-linked
benefit structure, the longevity risk is significantly magnified. Another benefit
structure-related factor is the nature of lump sum options. If a plan permits members to take a lump sum payment in lieu of a pension at an attractive conversion
price, then longevity risk will be diminished by an amount that depends on the
take-up rate.
Relative to the financial risks faced by most DB pension plans, longevity risk is
usually smaller. For most U.S. and U.K. plans, their traditional high allocation to
growth assets (principally equities) has meant that longevity risk has generally been
smaller than investment risk. Additionally, longevity risk has been typically smaller
than the interest rate risk associated with the pension liability. Despite this, longevity risk can emerge as much more significant in relative terms if the plan has low
funded status, has substantially de-risked by reducing its equity allocation, and/or
has hedged a significant amount of its liability interest rate risk.
Unfortunately, the significance of longevity risk must be measured in detail for
each pension plan. This involves a two-stage process, where the first stage involves
evaluating the likelihood and size of potential increases in life expectancy for the
plan members/beneficiaries. The second stage involves evaluating how these
potential future increases in life expectancy impact the pension liability. The resulting longevity risk depends on the factors related to the demographics and benefit
structure, as listed in Table 6.1.

Stage 1: Projecting Future Mortality
Life expectancy is estimated by measuring current mortality rates and forecasting
future rates, taking account of how the observed historical trend of falling mortality rates—referred to as mortality ‘improvements’—is likely to evolve in the future.
So the first stage in evaluating longevity risk requires quantifying the potential
range of outcomes for the trend of future mortality improvements, relative to the
initial (or base) mortality table.
Typically, actuaries develop longevity forecasts based on extrapolative methods
that project future mortality from historical trends (Lee and Carter 1992; Currie
et al. 2004; Cairns et al. 2006).2 These are complex models that are widely used
for valuation and risk assessment of pension plans and insurers’ annuity portfolios.
So historical mortality improvements provide a useful input into how mortality
rates might evolve in the future. Figure 6.1 shows average annualized mortality
improvements for U.S. males in five-year age groups over the 41-year period 1968–
2008.3 These average improvements range from 0.96 percent per annum (p.a.) for
ages 25–29 to 1.92 percent p.a. for ages 60–64. Note that a mortality improvement
of 0.96 percent p.a. means that next year’s mortality rate will be 99.04 percent of
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Figure 6.1. Average mortality improvements for U.S. males in different age groups over the
period 1968–2008 compared with Scale BB.
Source: LifeMetrics data for the U.S. national population and Society of Actuaries (2012).

this year’s mortality rate, then the following year’s mortality rate will be 99.04 percent of the next year’s rate, etc.
It is important to note that the average improvements in Figure 6.1 obscure considerable variation over time. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, which shows annualized five-year mortality improvements for ages 70–74.4 The average mortality
improvement for this age group is 1.74 percent p.a., but over the period it shows
an upward trend rising from 0.70 percent p.a. to 2.44 percent p.a. with significant
volatility.
For comparison, Figure 6.1 also shows the Scale BB forecast improvements published by the Society of Actuaries (2012) for use in pension valuations. The Scale
BB improvements are generally below the historical averages, except for ages 75
and over, but even for these higher ages the Scale BB improvements are significantly below the most recent five-year improvements.
If we take an aggregate view of five-year mortality improvements across all age
groups and all years collectively, then the average improvement comes to 1.43 percent p.a. with a standard deviation of 1.51 percent and a 95 percent confidence
‘worst case’ improvement of 3.38 percent p.a. Figure 6.3 shows a histogram of
all these mortality improvements, which illustrates the degree of volatility in the
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Figure 6.2. Annualized five-year mortality improvements for U.S. males aged 70–74 over
1968–2008.
Source: LifeMetrics data for the U.S. national population and author’s calculations.
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Figure 6.3. Histogram of mortality improvements 1968–2008. Annualized five-year mortality improvements for U.S. males in five-year age groups from 20–24 to 85–89.
Source: LifeMetrics data for the U.S. national population and author’s calculations.

historical observations. Note the absolute worst case is an improvement of 8.55 percent p.a., which occurred for ages 30–34 over the period 1995–2000.

Stage 2: Impact on the Pension Liability
The second stage in the evaluation of longevity risk involves measuring the impact
of projected mortality improvements on the pension liability. This can be evaluated
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Table 6.2 Mortality q-duration and interest rate duration for generic U.S. pension benefits
without a lump-sum option

Initial life expectancy
Impact on life expectancy of an unexpected mortality
improvement of 1% p.a.
q-duration for a fixed pension*
q-duration for an inflation- or COLA-linked pension*
Interest rate duration for a fixed pension**
Interest rate duration for an inflation- or COLA-linked
pension**

45-year-old
pre-retirement

65-year-old
retiree (pensioner)

37.1 years
+3.9 years

19.2 years
+1.4 years

16
22
36
39

5
8
11
13

Notes:
* % increase in pension value due to a 1% p.a. unexpected improvement in mortality rates
** % increase in pension value due to a 1% fall in interest rates
Source: Author’s calculations.

either in terms of a stochastic value-at-risk (VaR) metric or in terms of a sensitivity
metric similar to interest rate duration called mortality duration, or ‘q-duration’
(Coughlan et al. 2007a).
Mortality q-duration is defined as the percentage increase in the value of a pension liability if mortality improvements are higher (and mortality rates correspondingly lower) than expected by 1 percent per year compounded (Coughlan et al.
2008a). Table 6.2 compares the mortality q-duration and interest rate duration for
generic U.S. pension benefits without lump sums for 45-year-old and 65-year-old
U.S. males. Note that q-duration, although much smaller than interest rate duration, is still significant. This is partly due to the mortality improvement expectations
for these individuals and partly due to the current interest rate environment, in
which nominal interest rates are very low and real rates are negative at all but the
longest maturities.5 Table 6.2 shows that if mortality improvements are underestimated by 1 percent p.a. then a fixed pension liability (with no inflation or COLA
linkage) increases by 15 percent for 45-year-olds and by 5 percent for 65-year-olds.
For an inflation- or COLA-linked liability the increases are 22 percent and 8 percent respectively. Note that the longevity risk and interest rate risk are both higher
for younger plan members than for older members, reflecting the longer duration
(q-duration and interest rate duration) of pensions for the former.

Longevity, Interest Rate, and Inflation Risks
Longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk are the key risks to which DB
pension liabilities are subject,6 but the relationship between them is often overlooked. For example, despite the fact that mortality rates and interest rates appear
to be uncorrelated, longevity risk and interest rate risk are actually interdependent. When interest rates fall, longevity risk increases, and when life expectancy
increases, interest rate risk increases. Moreover, the impact of a combined change
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Figure 6.4 Impact of an interest rate stress and mortality improvement stress on the value
of the pension liability (fixed benefit payments) for 45-year-olds.
Source: Author’s calculations.

in interest rates and longevity is greater than the sum of the parts. In other words,
the impact of a combined fall in interest rates and an increase in mortality improvements is actually greater than the sum of the impacts of these changes separately.
This compounding effect can be seen clearly in Figure 6.4. The same is true of the
combination of longevity risk and inflation risk.
The obvious implication of this interrelationship is that longevity risk and interest rate risk (and inflation risk where appropriate) should be measured and managed together in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, the advent of longevity swaps
now makes it practical to coordinate the hedging of longevity risk and interest rate
risk of pension liabilities. This brings a new dimension to so-called liability-driven
investing (LDI) strategies and to other strategies that are liability ‘aware.’

The Significance of Longevity Risk
Such analysis shows that longevity risk can be very significant for many DB pension plans, depending on their benefit structure and demographics. It can lead to
higher benefit payments than expected over a longer period of time than expected,
thereby increasing the value of the pension liability. This can have a devastating
impact on the funded status of the plan over the medium term—even if the investment and risk management strategies are best in class.
Ignoring longevity risk means that pension plans cannot be credibly managed
for the long term. It also means that pension buyouts/terminations will appear relatively more expensive. For these reasons, longevity risk needs to be incorporated
into both the process of measuring risk and the strategy for managing risk.
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Evolution of Longevity Risk Management
The development of new tools such as longevity swaps has made longevity risk
management viable for DB pension plans. Before the development of such tools,
the management of longevity risk was rigidly tied to both funding and the management of other pension-related risks. In particular, instruments for removing longevity risk also removed other risks and, moreover, required that the pension be
funded at least to the level of the risk mitigation. In this section, we briefly review
the evolution of longevity risk management from traditional annuities to the flexible, new capital markets solutions. The different types of longevity risk management solutions are summarized in Table 6.3.
Longevity risk management essentially began as an insurance activity. This
involves individuals and DB pension plans buying annuities from insurers, in order
to provide certainty of retirement income regardless of how long people live. The
annuity insurers then invest the proceeds from selling annuities and manage the

Table 6.3 Summary of longevity risk management solutions that have been transacted
Solution

Type of
contract

Risks transferred or
hedged

Comments

Buyout or
termination

Insurance

Removes pension plan from the
sponsor’s balance sheet

Buy-in

Insurance

Lump sum offer

Longevity risk and all
other financial and
demographic risks
Longevity risk and all
other financial and
demographic risks
Longevity risk and all
other risks

Agreement
between
sponsor and
beneficiaries
Capital
Longevity risk only
markets or
insurance

Longevity swap

q-forward

Capital
markets

Longevity risk only

Synthetic buy-in Capital
markets or
insurance

Longevity risk and
selected other
financial risks

Out-ofthe-money
longevity
swap

A portion of the
longevity risk.
Specifically just
that associated with
large increases in life
expectancy

Capital
markets or
insurance

Source: Author’s tabulation.

Annuities become pension plan
assets and the plan remains on the
sponsor’s balance sheet
Removes pension plan from the
sponsor’s balance sheet

Exchanges actual pension benefit
payments (based on realized
longevity) for a fixed set of
payments
Exchanges a payment based on a
realized mortality rate for a fixed
payment
Combines longevity swaps with
hedges of financial risks (e.g.
interest rate swaps) in a flexible
way. May also include asset swaps
Does not hedge increases in life
expectancy that are below a
certain level
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assets (i.e. investments) against these liabilities (i.e. annuities). Since annuities are of
very long duration, insurers manage these portfolios using a carefully constructed
long-term investment and risk management program.

Pension Buyouts, Buy-ins, and Terminations
The traditional solution for managing the longevity risk in a DB pension plan is
to transfer the liability, along with all its risks, to an insurer via a contract of insurance. This type of transaction is called a pension buyout, or pension termination.
A buyout is one endgame for a DB pension plan, in that it removes the pension
liability from the plan sponsor’s balance sheet. This process involves transferring
the pension assets and liabilities to an insurer, together with a top-up payment.
This payment is required to bring the assets up to the level of the so-called ‘buyout liability,’ which is typically larger than the size of the liability recorded in the
accounts. This liability is larger because it generally reflects more realistic longevity assumptions, market-based risk-free discount rates, expenses, and a risk
premium.
A related type of solution is a pension buy-in, which, in contrast to a buyout, does
not remove the pension liability from the sponsor’s balance sheet. It involves the bulk
purchase of annuities by the pension plan to match the obligations and risks associated with a subset of the plan’s liabilities, typically associated with retired members.
In a buy-in, the annuities become assets of the plan and reflect the exact mortality
and demographic characteristics of the plan’s beneficiaries. Buy-ins are often used
as stepping stones to a buyout. They effectively reduce the size of the pension plan in
economic terms, but not necessarily in accounting or regulatory terms. Their utility
lies in their ability to enable the plan to move towards a buyout gradually over time,
allowing the sponsor to avoid the large upfront payment that is required in a buyout
(at least for plans that are underfunded on this basis) and also allowing the sponsor to
take advantage of periods in which annuity pricing is favorable.
Note that as a result of innovation, actual transactions have recently become
more complex and in many cases cannot be accurately characterized as a simple
buyout or buy-in.
The modern longevity market, of which buyouts and buy-ins are a part, effectively began in 2006 in the U.K. with the launch of several new monoline insurers
set up specifically to acquire DB pension plans.7 Prior to this time, the buyout market in the U.K., like that in the U.S. and elsewhere, comprised pension plans that
were being wound up, often due to the insolvency of the sponsor. This proto-market
was characterized by a large number of small buyout transactions typically totaling
£1.5–2 billion a year in the U.K., and similar levels in the U.S. and Canada.
Crucially for the development of the market, the new specialist insurers were
backed by investment banks and private equity, which brought a new mindset and
helped crystallize innovation within the market. This has led to the creation of new
capital market-based solutions, as well as new insurance-based solutions.
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New Solutions for Longevity Risk
Shortly after the birth of the longevity market, capital markets-based solutions for
managing longevity risk began to emerge. These solutions were motivated by a
perceived need for additional capacity for bearing longevity risk; greater diversity
of counterparties; liquidity and flexibility; fungibility; and better management of
counterparty credit risk.

Longevity Bonds
One of the earliest proposals for a capital markets-based longevity hedging instrument was the so-called longevity bond (Blake and Burrows 2001; Blake et al. 2006),
which predated the birth of the longevity market. A longevity bond (or survivor
bond) is essentially a life annuity bond with no return of principal, whose payments
decline in line with the survivorship profile of a population of individuals. If the
individuals in the population live longer than expected, then the bond makes correspondingly larger payments than expected.
The first attempt to issue a longevity bond to manage the longevity risk of DB
pension plans took place in 2004, when the European Investment Bank (EIB)
sought to launch a 25-year, £540 million longevity bond with an initial coupon of
£50 million (Azzopardi 2005). The reference population for calculating survivorship was all 65-year-old males from the national population of England and Wales
as reflected in mortality statistics produced by the U.K. Government Actuary’s
Department. The structurer and lead manager for the bond was the French bank
BNP Paribas, which intended to assume the longevity risk and then reinsure it
through PartnerRe. Unfortunately, the bond was unsuccessful for several reasons
connected with its structure and the lack of education of its target market (Blake
et al. 2006).
Then in 2006, the World Bank, with the help of the Chilean insurance regulator, the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS), made another attempt
to issue a longevity bond, but this time in Chile (Zelenko 2011). The bond was
targeted at insurers who provide retirement annuities and the SVS agreed to provide explicit regulatory capital relief to insurers who hedged the risk. A feasibility
project was conducted with BNP Paribas, but the effort foundered due to the high
cost of what was envisaged to be a World Bank-issued longevity bond. Following
this, the World Bank turned to J.P. Morgan to develop a more cost-effective
25-year maturity bond structure that was designed to provide an effective hedge,
with minimal basis risk. The longevity bond was to be issued out of a collateralized special purpose entity, with Munich Re taking the longevity risk and J.P.
Morgan managing the cash flow mismatch between the various payment streams
(Coughlan 2009; Life & Pension Risk 2010). This bond, like others before it, was
not successful for reasons related to its novelty and what was perceived to be little
need to hedge.
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The First Successful Capital Markets Solutions
In 2007, a very different capital markets instrument for transferring longevity risk,
called a ‘q-forward,’ was proposed (Coughlan et al. 2007b). This instrument was a
mortality forward-rate contract, a financial derivative that locks in a fixed mortality
rate at a future time. Its name comes from the actuarial symbol for a mortality rate, ‘q.’
A q-forward is an agreement in which two parties agree to exchange an amount
proportional to the actual, realized mortality rate of a given population, in return
for an amount proportional to a fixed mortality rate at a future date (the maturity
of the contract). The importance of q-forwards derives from the fact that they are
building-blocks from which other, more complex, instruments can be constructed.
When appropriately designed, a portfolio of q-forwards can be used to hedge
the longevity exposure of an annuity or a pension liability with a high degree of
effectiveness.
The first successful capital markets transaction to hedge longevity risk was in fact
a q-forward contract. It was executed by Lucida PLC, a pension buyout insurer,
in January 2008 (Lucida 2008; Symmons 2008). The instrument was a q-forward
linked to a longevity index based on England and Wales national male mortality for
a range of different ages.8 The hedge was provided by J.P. Morgan, and was novel
not just because it involved a longevity index and a new kind of product, but also
because it was designed as a hedge of liability value rather than a hedge of liability
cash flow. In other words, it hedged the value of the annuity, not the actual annuity
payments.
Soon afterwards, in July 2008, J.P. Morgan completed another capital
market-based longevity hedge, this time with Canada Life in the U.K. (Trading
Risk 2008; Life and Pension Risk 2008). But in this case, the hedging instrument
was different from that used by Lucida. It was a 40-year maturity £500 million
longevity swap linked not to an index, but to the actual mortality experience of
the 125,000-plus annuitants in Canada Life’s annuity portfolio. It also differed in
being a cash flow hedge of longevity risk by hedging the variability in pension benefit cash flows rather than just the variability in the value of the liability. And most
significantly, this transaction brought capital markets investors into the longevity
market for the very first time, as the longevity risk was passed from Canada Life to
J.P. Morgan and then directly on to investors. The Canada Life–J.P. Morgan longevity swap has become a standard instrument for transferring longevity risk. Such
a longevity swap involves the exchange on a regular basis of the actual realized
annuity, or pension benefit, payments for a fixed set of payments based on fixed life
expectancy.
The third capital markets longevity swap to be completed was a hybrid of
the first two, involving a hedge of both cash flow and value provided by RBS to
U.K. insurer Aviva in March 2009. It was a £475 million hedge based on the actual
mortality experience of Aviva’s annuitants. The longevity risk in this transaction
was also placed with a group of capital markets investors (Towers Perrin 2009;
Trading Risk 2010).
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June 2009 saw the execution of the first longevity swap implemented by a pension plan. Babcock International implemented a series of customized longevity
swaps totaling £1.2 billion to hedge the longevity risk in its three U.K. pension
plans. These were capital markets swaps transacted with Credit Suisse. Although
the structure of the swap was not new, being essentially the same as that of the
Canada Life–J.P. Morgan swap, it was significant in that it demonstrated the practical relevance of longevity swaps for managing longevity risk in DB pension plans.

New Insurance Solutions
At the same time, product innovation was also occurring in insurance-based solutions. An example of this was the ‘synthetic pension buy-in,’ the first of which was
transacted in July 2009 by the pension plan of RSA Insurance Group. This was
essentially an asset-swap-funded longevity swap executed in insurance format with
Rothesay Life, which also incorporated hedges of inflation risk and interest rate risk.
An important component in this £1.9 billion transaction was a total return swap—
of U.K. government securities (gilts) for higher-yielding government-backed
bonds—whose cash flows were used to fund the longevity swap. The key to this
synthetic buy-in was the effective combination of insurance and capital markets
capabilities across Rothesay Life and its parent, Goldman Sachs (Tsentas 2011).
Also in 2009, the first public sector pension plan transacted a longevity swap in
the U.K. The Royal County of Berkshire Pension Fund entered a £750 million
insurance-based longevity swap with Swiss Re to hedge a portion of its longevity
risk.

Initiatives to Facilitate Market Development
In addition to the developments described which were designed to facilitate individual transactions, there were also a number of initiatives broadly aimed at facilitating the development of the longevity market as a whole. Here we mention the
most significant.
The first of these was LifeMetrics (Coughlan et al. 2007a, 2007c, 2008b),
launched by J.P. Morgan in association with the Pensions Institute and Towers
Watson in 2007, with the aim of promoting standardization and education.
LifeMetrics was from its launch a publicly available set of resources for measuring
and managing longevity risk that included a risk management framework, longevity indices (for the U.S., England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands), analytics, and software. The framework blended actuarial and financial perspectives
on longevity, in order to educate and establish a common basis for longevity risk
management across the insurance, pension, banking, and investment management
industries.
Then in November 2008, Hymans Robertson, a pension consultant, launched
an organization to enable U.K. pension plans to pool mortality data in return for
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regular analysis and reporting on longevity (Hymans Robertson 2008). Called
Club Vita, it aimed to provide pension plans with better and timelier information
on longevity trends. By 2011, Club Vita had amassed a huge longevity database
with more than 130 large pension plans contributing data, including the U.K.’s
Pension Protection Fund (PPF).9
Another facilitating initiative was the formation in 2010 of a not-for-profit,
cross-industry trade association called the Life & Longevity Markets Association
(LLMA). The LLMA aims to ‘promote a liquid, traded market in longevity and
mortality-related risk’ by supporting the development of ‘consistent standards, methodologies and benchmarks.’10 In April 2011, the LLMA acquired the
LifeMetrics Longevity Index from J.P. Morgan.

Developments in the U.S. Market
The U.K. initiated the development of the longevity market, but progress has
also been made recently in other countries, notably the U.S., Canada, and the
Netherlands. The U.S., in particular, has seen several important transactions since
2011. For example, in May 2011, U.S. insurer Prudential announced a high-profile
$75 million buy-in for the pension plan of Hickory Springs Manufacturing
Company. Then 2012 saw several significant transactions, including very large
deals by General Motors and Verizon. We return to these in the next section.

Pension Risk Management and
Corporate Finance
Next we describe the corporate finance context of DB pension plans, which provides the backdrop for the management of longevity risk and also has important
implications for the sustainable management of these plans.
In 2012, four major U.S. corporations announced significant initiatives to
address the challenges associated with their U.S. pension plans. Each of these was
very different from the other. The first took place in April, when Ford announced
it was offering lump sum payments to some 90,000 retirees (pensioners) and terminated vested (i.e. deferred) plan members as part of a long-term de-risking
strategy. This offering effectively transferred the longevity risk, investment risk,
and all other pension-related risks to the individual members. This was followed
by General Motors’ (GM) announcement in June of its intention to remove $29
billion of pension liability from its balance sheet, with a combination of (a) retiree
lump sums, (b) a spin-off of active and terminated vested members into a new GM
pension plan, and (c) the termination of the residual retiree plan. This combination transferred the longevity risk to external parties, including retirees and an
insurance company (Prudential). Then in October, Verizon announced the buyout
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(with accounting settlement) of $7.5 billion of pension liabilities. The same month,
AT&T announced a plan to contribute $9.5 billion of preferred stock in its wireless
business into its pension plans. This last transaction was a pension funding transaction without an annuity purchase or a lump sum offering.
The diversity of these transactions is striking, reflecting as it does the varied
circumstances and objectives of the sponsors and their associated pension plans.
This diversity also emphasizes the importance of understanding the situations
and perspectives of both the sponsor and the pension plan when evaluating risk
management and funding. It is particularly important to note the interrelationships between them. For corporate pension plans, these interrelationships need to
be understood in the context of corporate finance.
The literature addressing DB pensions in the context of corporate finance goes
back several decades (e.g. Tepper and Afflect 1974; Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977;
Black 1980; Tepper 1981). However, those papers involved simple models used
to illustrate the principles. It was not until the 2000s that these ideas began to be
widely promoted, and researchers and investment banks began to develop practical methods to incorporate them into decision-making (Coughlan and Ong 2003;
Bodie 2004; Jurin and Margrabe 2005; Frieman et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2006).

Impact of the Pension Plan on the Sponsor
The relevant corporate finance implications of DB pension plans relate to their
impact on the firm’s (a) capital structure, (b) risk profile, and (c) enterprise value. In
particular, we note the following.
A DB pension liability is a form of debt, which is held by the plan members
and collateralized by pension assets (Feldstein and Morck 1983; Bodie 2004). In
fact, investors view pension deficits, or underfunding, as being like debt, but riskier
(Long et al. 2010). As a result, an underfunded pension has an impact on the credit
rating of the firm as it is effectively a claim against the future operating cash flows of
the business, which reduces the security of other debtholders. Carroll and Niehaus
(1998) established empirically that debt market valuations actually do reflect the
funded status of the plan.
The funded status of a DB pension plan is also reflected in equity market valuations of the sponsor, as established by a number of empirical studies (Feldstein and
Seligman 1981; Feldstein and Morck 1983; Bodie et al. 1987; Bulow et al. 1987;
Bodie and Papke 1992; Long et al. 2010).
Pension risk adds volatility to the sponsor’s stock price, increases the equity beta
of the firm, and raises the weighted average cost of capital or WACC. Moreover, a
pension plan typically decreases the firm’s optimal leverage ratio and reduces debt
capacity (Frieman et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2006; Gold 2008; Long et al. 2010).
Pension risk adds to the overall risk profile of the corporation, consuming risk
budget and displacing business opportunities that might have otherwise been pursued. If the risk of the pension is too great, then it can impact liquidity and/or

104

Recreating Sustainable Retirement

financial strength, leading to reduced access to the capital markets and threatening
the execution of business plans (Coughlan and Ong 2003; Frieman et al. 2005;
Gold 2008).
These points demonstrate that a DB pension plan can have a significant impact
on the value of a firm’s debt and equity through both the plan’s funding level and
its risk profile. In particular, Long et al. (2010) present an empirical analysis that
suggests that the sponsor’s stock price is inversely related to the size of the pension liability and directly related to its funded status. Moreover, it appears that
the impact of funded status on debt and equity prices is asymmetric. Jurin and
Margrabe (2005) developed a theoretical model for this based on the option-like
profile created by the U.S. excise tax on the reversion of pension surpluses. See also
Coronado et al. (2008).

Impact of the Sponsor on the Pension Plan
Conversely, a firm’s capital structure decisions, corporate risk profile, and financial
strength have an impact on the fair value of the claims of pension plan members.
The members of an underfunded plan rely on the sponsor to make contributions to
eliminate the deficit and ensure all pensions are paid in full at some future time. The
sponsor’s ability to do so depends on these factors and is summarized in its credit
rating. Note that even if plan members’ claims are collateralized by a fully funded
asset portfolio, this may only be temporary because of a risky asset allocation or a
liability that is growing faster than asset returns. In other words, the plan members
hold a contingent call on the firm’s future cash flows even if the plan is currently
fully funded. As a result, the capital structure, corporate risk profile, and financial
strength of the sponsor should be of great interest to plan members and fiduciaries.

Both Perspectives Matter: Sponsor and Plan
While a DB pension plan must always be managed in the best interest of its members, the previous discussion suggests that the management of any such plan
should take into account the perspectives of both the sponsor and the plan itself.
Furthermore, despite the existence of some conflicts, we argue that the relationship
between the two is in many ways symbiotic: what is good for the plan is often good
for the sponsor, and vice versa. In considering these two perspectives, the interrelationships between sponsor and plan necessitate a holistic approach to evaluating
pension decisions. This has a long history, and it involves consolidating the pension
plan and the sponsor into each other’s economic balance sheet (see Treynor et al.
1978). It was originally referred to as the ‘augmented balance sheet,’ but we shall
use the term ‘holistic balance sheet.’
From the sponsor’s perspective, the pension plan should be consolidated into the
corporate balance sheet and evaluated using the principles of corporate finance,
with the aim of maximizing shareholder, or firm, value. We call this consolidation
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the holistic corporate balance sheet. Pensions need to be economically consolidated along
with the rest of the corporation despite the fact that the company is not the legal
owner of the assets in the pension fund, because it does effectively own the risks
and rewards associated with those assets. In particular, if the assets outperform, the
company’s contributions into the pension fund will fall. On the other hand, if the
assets underperform, then contributions will need to rise. For this reason, pensions
must be economically consolidated for the purposes of risk management and the
management of capital structure.
Conversely, from the plan’s perspective, the sponsor should be consolidated into
the pension balance sheet using the principles of financial economics, with the aim
of maximizing the probability that pension plan members (beneficiaries) receive
the full benefits they have been promised. We call this consolidation the holistic pension balance sheet. An important component on the asset side of this holistic balance
sheet is the so-called ‘sponsor covenant,’ which reflects the ability and willingness
of the sponsor to fund the plan and ensure that pensions are paid in full. All underfunded plans rely on the sponsor covenant, the value of which reflects the credit
rating of the sponsor, the level and timing of planned contributions, and the associated risks. Also included on the asset side are other contingent assets such as benefit
guarantees from bodies such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
in the U.S. and the PPF in the U.K. These organizations make payments in the
event that the assets fall short of what is needed for a specified guaranteed benefit level. Recently, the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
(EIOPA) has been discussing the notion of a holistic balance sheet for pension plans
as the basis of future European pension regulation. This version of the holistic balance sheet also includes contingent assets, such as benefit guarantees and the sponsor covenant (European Commission 2012).
The holistic balance sheet concept, as applied to both the sponsor and the pension plan, neatly summarizes the interdependencies between these two entities and
provides an objective basis for evaluating strategies for sustainable management of
the plan. This concept is fundamentally based on a purely economic view of pensions, rather than the more traditional accounting view.

Managing Longevity Risk in Pension Plans
With the advent of longevity swaps and the other new solutions for longevity risk
management described earlier in the chapter, pension longevity risk can now be
managed in a flexible and customized way, similar to the way in which other pension risks are managed. This is an important element of ensuring the sustainability
of a DB pension plan over the long term. Prior to the development of these new
instruments, longevity risk could only be fully hedged with annuities in the form of
a buyout or a buy-in, which required all risks to be hedged at the same time and was
not possible unless the plan was adequately funded.
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As we have argued, corporate finance provides the appropriate context for managing longevity risk and developing sustainable DB pension strategies. As such, it
provides important insights into the economics of pension decisions from the perspectives of the key stakeholders: the plan beneficiaries and the corporate sponsor.

Framework for Sustainability
Now that all the tools are available to manage pension plans sustainably, what is
required is a framework for evaluating the key decisions such as whether to transfer
or keep the pension plan; how much longevity risk to hedge (this is relevant if the
plan is being kept, or if a buyout is planned at a distant time in the future); and the
degree to which funding and the management of other risks should be pursued in
conjunction with longevity risk management.
The framework we propose acknowledges the interrelationships between the
pension plan and the sponsor, and the connections with corporate finance discussed earlier. In particular, from the sponsor’s perspective, the relevant decision
metrics are linked to valuation in terms of shareholder value and/or enterprise
value. This will be driven by the impact of the pension plan on the corporate cost
of capital, corporate risk profile, and competing uses of cash flow. On the other
hand, from the pension plan’s perspective the relevant decision metrics are linked
to the valuation of the sponsor covenant. This will be driven by the impact of the
pension plan on corporate credit quality, corporate risk profile, and cash flow.
Several tools are important in implementing this framework. Foremost among
these are the holistic balance sheets of both the sponsor and the pension plan, as
illustrated in Figure 6.5. These capture the economic impact of contingent assets
and liabilities, a realistic measurement of the pension liability, and the interdependencies between the sponsor and the plan. Note the contingent liability on
the sponsor’s balance sheet, which incorporates additional claims on the sponsor,
including the additional liability that would result if the funded status falls below
its current level, as well as the excise tax that would accrue should the plan become
significantly overfunded.
Also important are the risk profiles, or risk decompositions, of both the sponsor
and the pension plan. Table 6.4 summarizes the main financial and demographic
risks in the risk profile of a typical DB pension plan.
The framework can be summarized as follows. First, evaluate the pension liability in economic terms. This includes the use of market interest rates for discounting liability cash flows, up-to-date mortality base tables, and realistic projections
for future mortality improvements. Second, model the interdependencies between
the pension plan and the sponsor, and their differing perspectives. This includes
taking account of the optionality in the holistic balance sheet of each. Important
metrics include materiality of the plan as measured by the ratio of economic pension liability to equity market capitalization (or enterprise value) and the ratio of
economic pension deficit to the market value of corporate debt. Third, evaluate

Sponsor Perspective
Holistic Corporate Balance Sheet

Pension Plan Perspective
Holistic Pension Plan Balance Sheet

Assets

Liabilities

Assets

Operating assets

Debt

Economic deficit

Liabilities
Pension liability

Contingent assets
Sponsor covenant
Equity
Pension related
contingent claims



Financial assets

Pension liability

Pension assets

Figure 6.5. The holistic balance sheets for the sponsor and the pension plan reflect the
economic interdependencies between them.
Note: Illustrative only, not to scale.
Source: Pacific Global Advisors.

Table 6.4 Major financial and demographic risks impacting
DB pension plans
Risk origin

Risk type

Asset-related risk

Equity risk
Interest rate risk
Nominal interest rate risk
Real interest rate risk
Includes inflation risk
Credit risk
Alternatives risk
Sponsor covenant risk
Benefit guarantee risk
Credit risk
Regulatory risk
Interest rate risk
Nominal interest rate risk
Real interest rate risk
Includes inflation risk
Demographic risk
Longevity risk
Other

Contingent asset-related risk

Liability-related risk

Source: Author’s tabulation.
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the risk profile for the plan and the sponsor. This refers to the size and composition of risks. For the sponsor, it includes the scale of pension risk in relation to the
sponsor’s operating and financing risks. For the plan, this includes the impact of the
sponsor covenant. Fourth, evaluate the key valuation metrics for the plan and the
sponsor. This includes the actual and contingent impact of the pension plan on cost
of capital, risk profile, credit rating, debt capacity, and cash flow. From these the
implications can be assessed for shareholder value, enterprise value, and the value
of the sponsor covenant. Finally, select the preferred strategy on the basis of how
it impacts the pension plan and the sponsor in terms of higher valuation metrics,
sustainable risk levels, and diversification.
This framework provides a basis for managing the pension plan for the long
term, which minimizes the likelihood that the sponsor will be required to make an
excessively large unplanned contribution and maximizes the likelihood that plan
members receive their full pension benefits. In particular, it facilitates a consistent
approach to evaluating decisions connected with the hedging and management
of longevity risk, along with liability-related interest rate risk and investment risks.

Conclusion
Longevity risk can be a significant risk for many DB pension plans and should, at
the very least, be measured along with the other risks facing these plans. With the
development of longevity swaps and other solutions, this risk can now be hedged in
a flexible and customized way. As a result, DB pension plans now have at their disposal a complete toolkit for ensuring they are managed in a sustainable fashion. In
fact, because of the compounding effects between longevity and interest rate risks,
it is highly desirable to manage these two liability risks in concert.
We have argued that longevity risk management should be addressed in a framework for managing DB plans based on corporate finance and financial economics.
Our proposed framework acknowledges the different, but interrelated, perspectives of the sponsor and the plan, and it argues that both must be taken into account
for optimal decision-making. Even fiduciaries acting in the interest of the plan
members/beneficiaries must take account of the sponsor’s perspective in order to
maximize the probability that pensions will be paid in full. This framework provides the basis for addressing key pension risk management decisions, including
whether to consider a buyout/termination or pursue the hedging of longevity risk
as part of the long-term management of the plan.

Disclaimer
Information herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable but Pacific
Global Advisors does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. Opinions and
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estimates constitute the judgment of the authors and are subject to change without
notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This material is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as a recommendation or
an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or financial instrument and should not serve as a primary basis for investment decisions.

Notes
1. See IMF (2012). The authors point out that mortality tables used by U.S. pension actuaries in particular have been consistently out of date.
2. Recently new models have emerged based on modelling the causes of mortality
improvement that provide greater insight into forecasting future mortality rates (Coburn
and Nakada 2012).
3. These mortality improvements are derived from LifeMetrics data for U.S. males, which
are available at www.lifemetrics.com.
4. The data in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 reflect rolling five-year mortality improvements that are
annualized.
5. The mortality assumptions for this example include expected mortality improvements
averaging 1 percent per year. At the time of writing, nominal swap rates are close to
2 percent at the ten-year point and 3 percent at the 30-year point, and with inflation
expectations of 2.5 percent, real rates are negative to slightly positive across the yield
curve.
6. Inflation risk can be considered an interest rate risk.
7. These specialist pension insurers included Paternoster, Synesis, Lucida, Pension
Insurance Corporation and Rothesay Life.
8. The mortality rates used in this first q-forward transaction were based on the LifeMetrics
Index for the mortality of the population of males in England and Wales (Coughlan
et al. 2007a).
9. The PPF plays a similar role to the PBGC in the U.S. It was established by the U.K.
Pensions Act 2004 to provide compensation to DB plan members, when the employer
suffers an insolvency event and there are insufficient assets in the plan to cover the PPF
level of benefits.
10. Taken from the LLMA website, <www.llma.org>.
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